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Michael C. Keeley and Gary C. Zimmerman*
The deregulation ofdeposit rates on personal checking accounts has
causeda largeportion ofthe M1 monetaryaggregate to become interest-
bearing andhas raisedthe question ofwhetherthe demandfor M1 might
also have been affected. This article compares the behavior ofderegu-
lated components ofMl with that ofthe regulated components prior to
deregulation. We find that the short-run open-market interest rate elas-
ticities of demand for the noninterest-bearing components prior to
deregulation are considerably lower than the elasticities ofthe deregu-
lated interest-bearing deposits. Deposit rate deregulation, therefore,
appears to have madethe demandfor M1 much more sensitive to interest
rate changes.
Many analysts argue that the traditional relation-
ship between Ml and the economy no longerholds.
As supporting evidence, they cite the apparent con-
tradiction between Ml's historically high annual
growth rate of approximately 11 percent between
September 1984 and September 1985 and the lack
of a resurgence of high inflation that would nor-
mally be associated with such rapid money growth.
Some have attributed this changed behavior to the
elimination of deposit rate ceilings, claiming that
the elimination has altered the relationship between
the demand for Ml and interest rates, income, or
both. In this article, we examine the behavior of
each of the components of Ml to see whether
deregulation can explain Ml's recent unusual
behavior.
Deposit rates onpersonalchecking accounts have
been deregulated very rapidly during the past few
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years through the authorization of NOW (Negoti-
able Order ofWithdrawal) accounts nationwide on
December 31, 1980 and Super NOW accounts on
January 5, 1983. While the NOW account was
restricted to pay a maximum of5Y4 percent interest,
the Super NOW was totally free of interest rate
ceilings. When introduced, the Super NOW had a
$2500 minimum balance requirement, but the
requirement was reduced to $1000 on January 1,
1985 and dropped entirely on January 1, 1986, thus
eliminating the regulatory distinction between
NOW and Super NOW accounts.
Personal interest-bearing checking accounts now
are free of all regulatory deposit rate or minimum
balance restrictions, although individual institu-
tions are free to impose theirown minimum balance
requirements. l Businesses, however, are still lim-
ited to holding noninterest-bearing demand
deposits.
This deregulation ofpersonal checking accounts
raises a number of questions about how the mone-
tary aggregates will behave because balances in the
new accounts are counted in the checkable deposit
componentofMl - the narrowly defined monetaryaggregate.2 Some have suggested that these
accounts may have attracted funds from savings-
type balances that were previously counted only in
the broader monetary aggregates, such as M2 or
M3.3Iftrue, shifts into 1Jf1e new accounts may have
alteredthebehaviorofM,l and changed the relation-
ships between Ml and the economy.
Even ifsuchportfolio shifts did notoccur, deposit
rate deregulation has the potential to change the
income and interest rate elasticities of the demand
for checkable deposits and, perhaps, even of cur-
rency. This also would change the behavior of the
monetary aggregates andprevent themfrom provid-
ing the signals for monetary policy they have in the
past.
In this paper, we explore these issues. Section I
provides abriefsketch ofthe deregulationofcheck-
able deposits and the impactofthose changesonthe
compositionofthe monetary aggregates. InSection
II, we outline a microeconomic model of the
demand for various transactions media and discuss
the likely impact of deregulation on that demand.
Section III presents our empirical evidence. Finally,
Section IV contains a summary and conclusions.
I. The Changing Composition of the Monetary Aggregates
Over the last decade, the composition ofMl has Following their authorization nationwide on
undergone a major shift (See Chart 1). The shift December 31, 1980 for banks and thrifts, NOWs
began with the gradual adoption ofNOW accounts, grew very rapidly. As Chart 2 shows, even after the
which were first available on an experimental basis initial large shift into NOWs was completed in
in New England. NOWs and a number of like 1981, interest-bearing checking accounts continued
accounts - ATS at banks and share drafts at credit to grow more rapidly than Ml's other components.
unions that will hereafter be referred to as NOWs- At the beginning of 1980, only 5 percent ofhouse-
raised the explicit interest paid on transaction bal- holds had interest-bearing checking accounts; by
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1983 1985interest-bearing checking account deposits
amounted to $200 billion; and they comprised over




The source of funds moved to interest bearing-
checkable deposit balances included in Ml may be
an indicator of how Ml will behave. If NOW
accounts attracted balances from savings or time
accounts, those balances may behave more like
savings balances than transaction balances and
impart a savings quality to Ml. One piece of evi-
dence suggesting that NOWs and SuperNOWs may
have attracted a sizable portion offunds from non-
transaction balances is that the average balances in
these transaction accounts are substantially higher
(at approximately $5,000 and $13,000, respec-
tively) than the average balance (of approximately
$1,500) in personal checking accounts prior to the
nationwide authorization ofNOWs.5
During the introductory NOW period, surveys
and studies suggested that about 25 percent of the
new money shifted into NOWs came from nontran-
saction sources.6 Thesefunds, generally believed to
have been.shifted from savings accounts and time
certificates, may be more interest-sensitive than
demand deposits, and therefore may have made Ml
more interest-sensitive.
However, there undoubtedly also was a major
shift of demand deposits into NOWs during the
introductory period. Chart 3 shows, for example, a
sharp drop in demand deposits coinciding with the
initial sharp increase in NOW balances in early
1981. Our statistical estimates of that shift are
consistent with the earlier estimates - they show
that about71 centsofeachdollarmoved intoNOWs
came from demand deposits.7
NOWs, while apparently more attractive than
demand deposits for many consumers, were only
partiallyderegulated(sincethey hadaceilingrate of
5Y4 percent) in contrast to the Super NOW, which
offered depositors a full transaction account free of
Chart 2
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49any interest ceilings. Thus, one might expect many
customers to preferthe Super NOW overthe NOW.
In fact, the Super NOW was very popular and
caused a dramatic shift in the composition ofMI.
By.year-end .1985, Sl1per NOWs represented over
10 percent of ML Chart 3 also suggests that a
majority ofSuperNOW deposits came from NOW
accounts8, althoughotherexplanations are possible.
The•growth in Super NOWs for example, is not
inconsistent with a significant inflow from such
nontransaction sources as passbook savings or time
accounts.
In sum, deregulation has dramatically changed
the composition ofM1 by making a large portionof
it interest-bearing. A future sharp increase in inter-
estrates could well induce flows from theremaining
noninterest-bearing demand deposits stiUheld by
households into interest-bearing accounts. To
understand better the impact of these actual and
potential changes, we present the theoretical effects
of deregulation and empirical estimates of their
magnitude in the following sections.
Chart 3
Transaction and Savings Deposits Over Time
Billions NOW Accounts Super NOW
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50II. Theoretical Framework
The effects ofremoving interest rate ceilings on
deposit accounts depend on how easy it was for
depository institutions to circumvent the ceilings
through nonprice competition in the first place. A
profit~maximizing depository institution would
expend resources (both interest and noninterest) on
attracting and holding various kinds ofdeposits to
equate the marginal costs of different types of
deposits, including transaction deposits. However,
depositors' returns neednotbe equal to the marginal
costs ofattracting deposits ifnonpriced services are
not perfect substitutes for cash interest payments.
At one extreme, some economists (for example,
Klein, 1974) have argued that ceilings can be cir-
cumvented costlessly through nonprice competi-
tion. Ifthis were correct, deposit rate deregulation
would have no effects. At the other extreme, much
ofthe traditional money demand literature (see Judd
and Scadding, 1982, for a review) assumes that the
ceilings were perfectly enforced so that deposits for
which the payment ofinterest is prohibited earn no
return, even in terms ofnonpriced services.
An intermediate position is that binding deposit
rate ceilings drive a wedge between depositories'
marginal costs of deposits and depositors' marginal
returns because of the inefficiencies of nonprice
competition (see Keeley and Zimmerman, 1985).
That is, in general, depositors value the implicit
payments (of nonprice competition) at less than
their cost because people generally prefer cash to
payments in kind. In other words, barter is less
efficient than monetary exchange.
The view that nonprice competition is inefficient
implies that removing a deposit rate ceiling would
increasethe return depositors receive without affect-
ing depositories' marginalcosts. Suchan increase in
depositors' returns should lead to a one-time
increase in the quantity ofdeposits in the affected
account. In addition, as we discuss in more detail
later, the increase in the level ofdepositors' returns
may affect the interest elasticities of demand for
deposits as well.
There is strong evidence supporting the view that
nonprice competition is inefficient: NOW accounts
succeeded in attracting large quantities of deposits
previously held in demanddeposits (as well as funds
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from other accounts), and Super NOW accounts
attracted funds from NOWs. These large shifts
would not have occurred if depositories had been
able to circumvent the ceilings costlessly. Thus, in
the aggregate, depositors' returns on Super NOW
accounts likely exceeded returns on NOWs, and the
returns on NOWs likely exceeded the returns on
demand deposits.9
The other, more commonly discussed (San-
tomero and Siegel, 1985), effect of deposit rate
deregulation is that deregulation may make deposit
rates vary more closely with open market interest
rates. 10 This effect is presumably due to the higher
cost ofvarying implicit rather than explicit interest
payments, at least in the short-run. However, as
Flannery (1982) has argued, explicit retail deposit
rates (adjusted for reserve requirements) are not
expected to vary one-for-one with open market rates
because there are adjustmentcosts to changing them
too. Thus, the importance ofthis effectis an empiri-
cal question.
Althoughthe most importanttype ofderegulation
of transaction accounts was the raising and then
removing of the deposit ceilings on them, ceilings
on term accounts and limited transactions accounts
such as the money marketdeposit account (MMDA)
also have been removed. Thus, rates on these other
accounts also may vary more than before. Since the
other accounts may be substitutes for transaction
accounts to a certaindegree, the increased variation
in term accounts' interest rates also may affect the
demand for transaction accounts and currency.
Interest and Income Elasticities
In sum, deposit rate deregulation may have
increased the· return and/or the covariation of
deposit rates with respect to open market rates.
Below, we analyze these potential effects on the
sensitivity ofthe demand for transaction deposits to
changesin income oropen marketinterest rates. We
begin by discussing the implications of a simple
inventory model of money demand, and then con-
sider a more general model ofasset demand.
An Inventory Model
Much of the literature on deregulation's effectshas used the simple inventory model of money
demand.ll This model, developed by Baumol
(1952), assumes that persons minimize the inven-
tory costs ofholding transaction balances by hold-
ing most oftheir financial wealth in one asset, such
as a bond. This model implies that the demand for
real transaction balances Dcan be written as 12:
intermediate stage. If nonprice competition were
inefficient, then these varying degrees ofregulation
would translate into own rates of interest (implicit
plus explicit) on transaction media with the follow-
ing ranking:
(3)
0= rcurrency< rdemanddeposits< rNOWs< rSuperNOWs
where D = real transaction balances
Y = real income
I' = open-market interest rate
I'd = rate on deposits
a = a parameter that depends on the
transactions costs of selling bonds
(assumed to be constant)
131 = elasticity of demand with respect to
income
132 = elasticity of demand with respect to
the opportunity cost of holding
deposits.
This equation shows that the elasticity ofD with
respect to the market rate 1', TJg depends on two
factors with opposite effects: how close I'd is to I' and
thecovariation ofI'd with respect to r. The closerthe
level ofthe rate on deposits to the open market rate
(that is, the closer I'd is to 1'), the greater the elas-
ticity; but the greater the covariation of I'd with
respect to 1', the lower the elasticity.
This model can be used to analyze how the
interest elasticities of various transaction media,
which are deregulated to different degrees with
regard to interest payments, might compare with
one another. The most highly regulated transaction
medium in a sense is currency, on which the own
rate is zero. This model predicts, therefore, that the
interest elasticity ofcurrency should be -132'
As mentioned previously, checkable deposits
were subject to varying degrees of regulation
regarding the payment of interest, with demand
deposits being the most highly regulated, Super
NOWs the leastregulated, andordinaryNOWsat an
(4)
TJcurrency< TJdemanddeposits< TJNOWs< TJ SuperNOWs
A GeneralizedAssetDemandModel
The simple inventory model has been criticized
on a numberofgrounds. Forone, ifreserve require-
ments were eliminated and deposit rates equalled
This ranking would still hold even ifthe covaria-
tionofI'd with 1', were not zero (which itis notfor the
Super NOW, for example), as long as it is small
comparedtothe differences in the levels ofI'd due to
the inefficiencies of nonprice competition. This
result, however, is dueto the logarithmicform ofthe
demand function, which in tum comes from the
inventory-cost minimizing basis of the model. A
more general asset demand function would not
necessarily reproduce this implication about the
ranking ofelasticities.
The Short-Run Versus Long Run
Although the covariation of deposit rates with
open-market rates may be low in the short-run,
especially for implicit interest payments, in the
long-run, it is likely that competitive forces would
push (implicit plus explicit) deposit rates towards
open market rates until they equalled the open
market rate times one minus the reserve require-
ment. Thus, even though the ranking in equation 4
might hold in the short~run, it would seem much
less likely to hold in the long-run because in the
long-run, I'd would adjust fully to changesin r.
Thus, deregulation may have substantial effects
on the short-run interest elasticities yet not affect
long-run elasticities. In the empirical analysis, the
model we employ allows for differences between
long-run and short-run elasticities.
If the own rate of interest on each of these
accounts does notvary with open market rates, then
equation 2 implies that Super NOWs should be the
most interest-elastic (in absolute value) and cur-




Differentiating IuD with respect to 1m gives:
dlnD = 0 = -13 (---!-\It -~\
dIm TJ r 2\f.-rct)' 81'J
52where r8i is the rate ofreturn on a substitute asset i,
and Y is real income (or wealth). Taking the deriva-
tive of equation 5 with respect to the open market
rate r gives:
+ + +
dD = oD ~+~~
dr ord or or81 or
+
+ ... +~ ~ + oD . (6)
orsn or or
open market rates, the model would collapse. A
more general model, similar to that discussed in
Santomero andSiegal (1985), which does notsuffer
from this drawback, views the demand for (real)
transaction balances as a generalized asset demand
that depends on the own rate of return, rates of
return on substitute assets (including the open mar-
ket instrument), and income or wealth:
This formulation has several implications about
the effects of deposit rate deregulation - both
deregulation of own rates and rates on substitute
bank deposits - on the sensitivity of transactions
media to the open marketrate, r. First, deregulation
of the own rate may increase ord!or. This alone
would lessen the interest-sensitivity (in absolute
terms) ofcheckable deposits. Second, deregulation
of substitute deposits would likely increase ors/or,
and thus increase the sensitivityofD with respectto
r (holding constant the own rate).
Third, by eliminating the inefficiencyofnonprice
competition, deregulation would increase the level
of rd and thus the partial derivatives in equation 6
would be evaluated at a higher level ofrd' Such an
increase in the level of rd would cause portfolio
shifts into transaction deposits, but without a
knowledge ofthe specific functional form ofequa-
tion 5, it is not pOssible to judge what the effect
would be on interest and income elasticities.
It appears that, in general, theory cannot predict
the net effect of deregulation on the interest-sen-
sitivity of checkable deposits with one exception.
The deregulation ofcheckable deposit rates as well
as the deregulation of other deposit rates should
increase the interest-sensitivity of the demand for
currency (since rd = 0), assuming that deposits are
substitutes for currency and that rates on checkable
and other deposits would vary more closely with
open market rates after deregulation.
Income Elasticity
Deregulation may also have altered the income
elasticity ofdemand for currency and bank transac-
tion deposits. The simple inventory model implies
thatthe incomeelasticityofthe demandfor all types
of transaction media, including fully deregulated
accounts, would be unaffected by deregulation (and
equal to 131) as long as rd < r. In contrast, the more
general model of asset demand suggests that, as rd
approaches r with deregulation, more and more
investment funds may be held in bank transaction
deposits because there are costs to holding multiple
investments or switching funds from the open-
market instrument into bank deposits. If so, the
income elasticities of deregulated accounts may
differfrom thoseofregulatedaccounts ifthe income
elasticityofdemand for investment balances differs
from that for transaction balances.
(5)
+ +
D = f(rd' rsl' rs2' ... ,rsn' r, Y)
III. Empirical Results
The traditional approach to studying the effects of Our approach has several potential advantages.
deposit rate deregulationonthe behavioroftransac- First, it may be better able to determine whether
tions media has been to try to determine if the deregulationhad aneffect. Deregulationofpersonal
behavior of an aggregate, such as MI or M2, checkable deposit accounts has been phased in
changed with deregulation (see, for example, Judd, gradually along with deregulation ofnoncheckable
1983 andJuddandMotley, 1984). This papertakes a deposits and limited checking accounts and reduc-
different approach, and tries to determine how tions in reserve requirements. Thus, it may be
deregulation might have affected the behavior of difficult to detect an abrupt change resulting from
each component ofthe Ml monetary aggregate. deregulation by examining an aggregate's behavior
53at anyone time even though a deregulated account
may behave much differently from a regulated one.
Second, our approach may yield more informa-
tion about deregulation's effects. In particular, only
an analysis ofthebehaviorofthe components ofMI
can test the ranking ofshort-run interest elasticities
ofdemandimpliedby theinventory modelofmoney
demand. The model implies, undercertain assump-
tions, that the most deregulated media would be the
most interest-elastic. Our analysis allows us to test
this hypothesis directly by comparing the elas-
ticities of currency, demand deposits, NOW, and
Super NOW accounts. By analyzing only the
behavior of an aggregate, one cannot compare the
demand elasticities of different transactions media
that have been deregulated to varying degrees.
Finally, our approach may yield more insight into
the future behavior of transactions deposits. Since
the final stepofderegulation was completedjustthis
year, the behavior of the Super NOW account - a
prototype of a fully deregulated account - may
give a better indication of the future behavior of
transactions deposits than the past behavior of an
aggregate dominated by regulated and partially
deregulated deposit accounts.
Below, we present estimates of the interest and
income elasticities of various transactions media:
currency, demand deposits, NOWs, and Super
NOWs. We also presentestimatesfor money market
deposit accounts (MMDAs) for purposes of com-
parison. However, before presenting estimates of
income and interestelasticities ofdemand, we pres-
ent some evidence on how the own interest rates on
two deregulated accounts - MMDAs and.. Super
NOWs - have behaved to shed lighton the hypoth-
esis that deregulation will increase the covariation
ofdeposit rates with respect to the open marketrate.
Covariation of Deposit Rates with
Open-Market Rates
The hypothesis that deposit rate deregulation will
increase the covariationofdeposit rates with respect
to open-market rates cannoteasily be tested directly
because there were no direct measures of(implicit)
deposit rates prior to deregulation. However, an
extreme version of this hypothesis - that deregu-
lated deposit rates will equal the open-market rate
times one minus the reserve requirement - can be
tested. An alternativehypothesis suggestedby Flan-
nery (1982) is that deposit rates respond sluggishly
54withrespect to open-marketrates because ofadjust-
ment costs. Tests of these hypotheses for Super
NOWsandMMDAs are presented inTable 1, which
contains regressions of MMDA and Super NOW
rates onthe three-month T-biUrate using monthly
data. 13
Thehypothesis thatdepositrates shouldequalthe
reserve-adjusted open market rate implies that, in a
linearregressionofaderegulated depositrate onthe
open-market rate (which we measure as the contin-
uous-time, annualized 3-month T-bill effective
yield), the constant term should be zero and the
slope equal to one minus the reserve requirement.
Estimates of the first set of regressions reject this
hypothesis. They both show positive and statis-
tically significant constant terms and slopes ofless
than one minus the reserve requirement (the reserve
requirements are zero for personal and .03 for
nonpersonal MMDAs, and .12 for SuperNOWS).14
One interpretation of the type of deposit rate
behavior implied by these results is that there are
adjustment costs involved in varying the. rate on
deposits. Inthe long-run, bank deposits would be
priced competitively (after adjusting for reserve
requirements), but in the short-run, the rate on
deposits would vary less than one-for-one with
open-marktitrates.
To test d~ctlyfor sluggishadjustment ofdeposit
rates, we estimated a standard "adjustment" model
in which a fraction ofthe difference, 'A, between the
actual deposit rate and the equilibrium deposit rate
is assumed to be eliminated in each period. The
second set of regressions in Table 1 contain esti-
matesofthis model. For the MMDA, the estimated
adjustmentcoefficient '11. is about one-third and the
long-runeffectofanincrease in the T-bill rateonthe
depositrate is somewhatless than unity (.88). A one
percentage point increase bill rate leads to
only a .30 point increase in the MMDA rate in one
month.
Super NOW rates behave even more sluggishly,
with an adjustment coefficient of .18 and a one-
month response ofonly .llpercentage point to a 1
pointincrease in the T-bill rate. Part ofthis greater
sluggishnessmay bedue.to themuchhigherreserve
requirements on Super NOWs, but the large dif-
ferences cannot be explained by reserve require-
ments alone. The explanation may lie in the greater
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costs involved in opening Super NOW accounts,
which increase the associated adjustment costs.
Another reason may be that tax incentives make
implicit interest a larger part of the return from
holding Super NOWs.
Insum, depositratesonretaildepositaccountsdo
not move one-for-one with open-market rates, at
least in the short-run. Even the MMDA, which is
not .sUbject to.a reserve requirement (on·personal
accounts),responds sluggishly in the .short-run·to
changes in open-market rates. The Super NOW
exhibits even more sluggish behavior. It seems
likely.that (before deregulation) implicit.rates on
checking deposits behaved at leastas sluggishlyand
perhaps even more so than Super NOW rates.
While not definitive evidence, the sluggish
behavior of the Super NOW rate suggests that the
main effect of deposit rate deregulation will be to
increase the short-run variationin therelative oppor-
tunity costoftransactiondeposits. Iftheelasticityof
demand for transaction deposits with respect to that
cost were constant, the increased relative variation
would imply an increase intheresponsiveness ofthe
transactions deposits to changes in the open-market
rate.
Effects of DeregUlation on Interest and
Income Elasticities
:perhaps the most direct way to determine the
effectofdepositratederegulationonthe interestand
income elasticities of demand for checkable
deposits is to compare the elasticities ofdemand of
fully and partially deregulated deposit accounts
with each other and with transactions media pro-
hibitedfrompaying interest. Below, we present
such comparisons.
Estimates.of interest and income elasticities of
specific transactions media were obtained from the
following partial-adjustmentform ofthe realmoney
dem~md function that has beenwidely used in past
studies:
In(Dit) = <Y + (l - '1I.)ln(DiH)
+ 'A131In(r) + 'A1321n(Y)




= real deposits at time t oftype i
= the nominal open-market inter-
est rate
Y = real income
Tl' . • ., T11 = monthly seasonal dummies
Trend = a linear time trend variable
Monthly data (not seasonally adjusted) from dif-
ferent subperiods within the time frame ofJanuary
1959 through February 1986 were used to estimate
the parameters ofequation 7. The CPI-UXL series,
which uses the rental equivalence method of com-
puting housing costs, was used to deflate all nomi-
nal variables. (This measure avoids the built-in
correlation between interest rates and housing cost,
and hence the price level, in the older CPI-U series
which included the mortgage costs ofhousing. See
Huizinga and Mishkin, 1985.) The nominal open-
market interest rate is the 3-month T-bill rate (con-
verted to a continuous-time yield from the bank-
discountbasis), andreal income is personal income.
In Table 2, estimated interest and income elas-
ticities are presented for three at least partially
deregulated deposit accounts: the Super NOW,
NOW, and MMDA, and are compared with esti-
mated interest and income elasticities for demand
deposits and currency held by the public both prior
to and after deregulation.
Estimates for the NOW account are presented
separately for the periods before and after the Super
NOW was introduced because ofa possible change
in its interest elasticity. It appears that Super NOWs
were successful in attracting substantial deposits
56from NOWs. Sincethe most interest~sensitivefunds
in NOWs likely shifted into SuperNOWs, NOWs
might have become less interest-elastic after Super
NOWs became available.
Finally, the firstthreemonths afteran accountwas
introduced were excluded from the sample periods
to allow for portfolio adjustment not related tothe
explanatory variables. For similar reasons, the two
months prior to the·introduction •of·NOWs were
excluded from the sample· used to estimate·the
models for demanddeposits and currency. 15
The estimated short-run (one-month) interest
elasticities presented in the first column ofTable 2
are relatively high for both Super NOW accounts
and NOW accounts prior to the introduction of
Super NOWs, averaging around - .10. This com-
pares to the interest elasticities ofdemand deposits
andcurrency of - .017 and - .005, respectively. In
fact, the estimated short-run interestelasticityofthe
SuperNOW is closerto the elasticityofthe MMDA
__an account usedprimarily for savings, nottrans-
actions - than the elasticity of either demand
deposits or currency prior to deregulation. The
NgWaccount appears to have become less interest-
el~stic after the introduction ofSuper NOWs, but it
stillis much higher than the short-run interestelas-
ticity of demand deposits or currency prior to
deregulation.
The results for demand deposits during the post-
deregulation period suggest that their short-run
interest elasticity increased over time. Forexample,
the e.stimated short-run interest elasticity was
- .044 during the 1981.04"1986.02 post-NOW
period and - .064 during the 1983.04-1986.02
post-SuperNOWperiod, compared to.an estimated
elasticity of only .017 during the
1959.01-1980.10 pre-NOW period. Nevertheless,
these higher·elasticities.are still far below those of
Super NOWsandeven conventional NOWs during
the pre-Super NOW period.
The estimated short"run interest elasticities of
demandfor currencyfor allperiodsare considerably
lower (in absolute value) than. the •elasticities of
SuperNOWs, NOWsordemand deposits astheory
predicts. However,there is someindication that.the
interest elasticity ofcurrency may be higherinthe
post-NOWperiod.
For the Super NOW and NOW, the estimated
long-run elasticities appear to be largerthan thatof
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demanddepositspriorto theintroductionofNOWs.
In addition, the speed of adjustment,A, for the
Super NOW is much greater than that for either
dell1and deposi\S orcurrency. The holdingof1l10re
savings~type funds in these accounts could account
for this faster adjustment if savings balances react
more quickly than transaction balances to changes
in int~rest rates. The rapidspeed of ~djustin~ntfor
the MMDA, which presumably consists mostly of
savings balances, provides supporting evidence. In
addition, the point estimateofAfor NgWs priorto
the introduction of Super NOWs (although not
statistically significant) also is higher than those of
demand deposits Or currency.
The results on income elasticities are less clear-
cut than those on interest elasticities. Although the
point estimates of the income elasticities ofSuper
NOW and NOW accounts are generally larger than
those of either currency or demand deposits,.their
standard errors also are large and none of the esti-
mates ~s statistically significant. As aresult, itis not
possible to determine whether these accounts are
more income-elastic than currency or demand
deposits. The estimated income elasticity for the
MMDA also is not statisticallysignificant, possibly
because its balances are ofa longerterm inve~tment
nature and therefore do· not respond to monthly
fluctuations in income.
Interpretation of Results
The results on the demand fOr varioustransac-
tionsmedia suggest that deregulation hasincreased
the. absolute value ofthe media'sshort-runinterest
elasticities. OneintefPretationofthese re~ultsisthat
they confirm the hypothesisofthe traditionalinven-
torymodelthatahigherlevelofratesonderegulated
accounts.in conjunction.with .rel~tively.little.OWn
ratevariation cau~es the demand for deregulated
~ccounts to. be more interest elastic, at least.in the
short-run. ThisintefPretationisconsistentwithboth
the lowerinterest elasticity ofdemand for cUrrency
(whose own rate is zero) comPared to <thatfor
demanddeposit~(whOSeimplicitrateis gre~terthan
zero),. and the. higher el~ticity of Super NOW
accountscomparedto that.ofdemanddeposits.
lbeseresultsare.also consistent withthe notion
that •lifting the ceilings·.on consumer. checkable
accounts has reduced the inefficiencies ofnonpricecompetition and thus increased the effective rate
depositors receive.
An alternative explanation might be that Super
NOWs and NOWs contain more savings-type bal-
ances than do demand deposits, and that savings
balances are more sensitive at the margin to interest
rate changes.
The interest elasticity results are consistent with
our finding that the own rates on Super NOWs do
notvary closely withopen marketrates in the short-
run. As a result, a change in market rates causes a
largerpercentage change in the opportunity cost of
holdingSuperNOWs. Since the inventory model of
moneydemand implies that the elasticityofdemand
with respect to the opportunity cost is constant,
greatervariability in the opportunity costofderegu-
lated accounts would explain why those accounts
apparently have higher interest-sensitivities with
respect to market rates.
One Additional Test
One additional test of this hypothesis is to esti-
mate the interest-sensitivity of the demand for a
deregulated account with respect to its opportunity
cost rather than the open market rate. Ifthe hypoth-
esis were correct, the short-run interest elasticity of
demand with respect to the opportunity cost for a
deregulatedaccountshouldbe muchclosertothatof
a regulated account with respect to the open market
rate.
This type of test can be carried out best for the
Super NOW since it is the only checkable deposit
entirely free from interest ceilings and for which
data are available on its own rate. However, as
discussed previously, it is likely that Super NOWs
do pay some implicit interest. Using its explicit rate
as a measure of the total rate therefore probably
biases the measured opportunity cost upward, and
thus the estimated interest-sensitivity.
The results ofestimating the model described by
equation 7 for SuperNOWs, butusing the logofthe
difference between the open-market rate (the three-
month Treasury bill rate) and the Super NOW rate
are as follows. As expected, the estimated short-run
elasticity with respect to the opportunity cost is
much lower (in absolute value) than the elasticity
58with respect to the open market rate as reported in
Table 2. (-.026 versus - .090). The estimated
short-run elasticity with respect to the opportunity
cost. is close to the elasticity of demand deposits
with respect to the market rate in the pre-NOW
period(-.017). Thus, this result also is consistent
with the prediction of the traditional inventory
demand model that deregulation will increase the
short-run elasticity with respect to the open-market
rate ifthe own rate does not vary strongly with the
open-marketrate.
Effects on l1li1
One implication of these results is that the
deregulation of rates should have increased the
interest-sensitivity of an aggregate such as Ml,
which includes NOW and Super NOW accounts.
The interest elasticity ofan aggregate such as Ml is
a weighted sum of the interest elasticities of the
aggregates' components - the weights being each
component's share ofthe aggregate. Below,wetest
the hypothesis by comparing the short-run interest
elasticity ofMl before and after the introduction of
NOWs.Theresults ofthistestarepreselltedinTable
3.
To determine whether the short-run interest elas-
ticityofdemandfor Ml increased afterNO\Vs were
introduced nationwide in January 1981,weesti-
mated the basic model described by equation.7
separately for the two periods 1959.01-1980.10
and 1981.04 - 1986.02. The first three months of
1981.wereexcludedbecauseNOW accounts werein
an adjustment phase then, and possibly attracted
funds ..not previously held in checkable deposit
accounts. The last two months of 1980 were
excluded because many batiks promoted the new
accounts by offering high rates on retail RPs at the
time.
59The results indicate that the short-run interest-
sensitivity of Ml apparently more than tripled (in
absolute value) from - .012 to - .041. To test
whether this increase was statistically significant,
the data from the two periods were pooled and a
fully interactive version ofequation7 was estimated
on the pooled sample, allowing each parameter to
take on different values in the two periods. In the
bottom part of Table 3, T-tests are presented of
whetherthe key parameters in the post-NOWperiod
are statistically significantly different from those in
the pre-NOW period. The tests show that the
increase in interest elasticity was statistically sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level, whereas neither
income elasticity nor the adjustment parameter
changed by a statistically significant amount. Thus,
the results provide very strong evidence that the
short-run interestelasticity ofMl in the period after
NOWs were authorized nationwide was higher (in
absolute value) than before. This result is consistent
with the much higher interest elasticities of Super
NOWs and NOWs, but does not prove that their
introduction was the sole cause of the increase in
interest-sensitivity ofMI.
Another possible cauSf of MI's increased inter-
est-sensitivity is an increase in the interest-
sensitivity ofthe other components ofMl as well,
perhaps due to the deregulation of noncheckable
accounts, such as the money market certificate, and
limited checking accounts, such as the MMDA. To
test this hypothesis, we estimated the model
described by equation 7 for demand deposits and
currency before and after the nationwide introduc-
tion ofNOWs. The results are reported in Table 4.
The point estimates of the interest elasticities of
demand deposits and currency are higher (in abso-
lute value) in the post-NOW period. However, only
the increase inthe demand deposit interestelasticity
is statistically significant.
The increase in the estimated interest-elasticity
for demand deposits may be due to a switch by
consumers into NOWs and Super NOWs that left
businesses holdin~ an increased portion ofdemand
deposits. It also might be due to deregulation of
other accounts that are substitutes for demand
deposits. Whatever the reason, the increase in the
interest elasticity ofdemand deposits is part of the
explanation for the increased interest elasticity of
M1. (It is also possible that currency contributed to
the increase, but we cannot determine statistically
whetheritdid.)16Also, SuperNOWs andJorNOWs
contributed to the increase since the elasticity ofMl
in the post-Super NOW period exceeds the elas-
ticities ofeither currency or demand deposits.
Because of an increase in the short-run interest
elasticity of each of the components of the Ml
monetary aggregate after deregulation, Ml is now
more interest-sensitive- about4 times more sensi-
tive according to our findings. Thus, MI should
show wider variations in response to exogenous
interest-rate changes now than before deregulation.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
Deposit rate deregulation has caused a major
change in the composition ofM1. As ofmid-1986,
30 percent of Ml consisted of interest-bearing
checking accounts. This changed composition of
Mland the associated rapid growth of its interest-
paying components has raised the question of
whether deposit rate deregulation has also changed
the demand for M1.
The empirical results presented in this paper
suggest that the short-run elasticity of demand for
MI with respect to the open market rate has been
affected, but that there were no statistically signifi-
cant changes in other parameters of the demand
function. Specifically, our results suggest that the
short-run interest elasticities of demand for NOW
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and Super NOW deposits exceed those of either
demand deposits or publicly held currency prior to
the nationwide authorization ofNOW accounts.
One explanation for these higher interest elas-
ticities is that deposit rate deregulation has
increased the total (implicit plus explicit) returns to
depositors by lessening the inefficiencies of non-
price competition while not increasing, at least by
much, the short-run covariation of total deposit
returns with respect to the open market rate. The
combination ofthese two factors, in tum, has led to
increased variation in the relative opportunity cost
of NOW and Super NOW deposits. Assuming the
elasticity ofdemand with respect to the opportunity
cost is constant implies that the short-run interestelasticityofthese accounts withrespect to the open-
market rate has increased.
An additional factor accounting for the increase
in the short-run interest-sensitivity of Ml is the
apparent coincident increase in the interest-sen-
sitivity of demand deposits with the nationwide
introduction ofNOW accounts. Also, there appears
to be an increase in the short-run interest elasticity
of· currency associated with·· the introduction of
money market certificates- an important first step
in the deregulation of deposit rates on nontransac-
tion accounts.
Notonly has depositrate deregulation apparently
changed the short-run behaviorofthe Ml monetary
aggregate, it is also likely to make the composition
ofMl more variable than before. This is becausethe
demand for the interest-bearing components ofMl
appears to be much more interest-elastic than the
nQninterest-bearing cornponents, at least in the
short-run. Moreover, deposit rate deregulation has
apparently indirectly increased.the.short-run. inter-
est elasticity ofdemand for the noninterest-bearing
components.
These changes in demand raise questions for
1ll0Iletary policy undervirtually anY view ofwhat
money is and how money is related to other aspects
of the economy. For one, they suggest that the
traditional relationships between Mlandthe econ-
omy have changed. For another, they raise an.even
more basic question ofwhether an aggregate com-
prisedofbothinterest-bearingandnoninterest-bear-
ing components with different interest elasticities
and changing relative prices is useful as a guide to
monetary policy.
FOOTNOTES
1. While deregulation has made interest-bearing check-
ing accounts available to all consumers, the prohibition
against the payment of interest on traditional noninterest-
bearing demand deposits remains. Hence, consumers
have the option of either interest-bearing NOW or Super
NOW accounts, or noninterest-bearing checking
accounts, which typically have both lower minimum bal-
ance requirements and lower fees.
2. M1 ($639.9 billion as of December 1985, notseasonally
adjusted) is definedto include onlyfinancial assets thatare
used as media of exchange. It includes publicly held
currency ($173.1 billion), travelers checks ($5.5 billion),
net demand deposits at banks ($281.3 billion), and other
checkable depositsconsisting ofNOWs, Automatic Trans-
fer Service (ATS) accounts, credit union share drafts and
demand deposits at thrifts ($115.8 billion), and Super
NOWs ($64.2 billion).
3. The broader monetary aggregate, M2, includes both
transaction balances reported in M1, and savings-type
balances, such as MMDAs, savings deposits, small time
certificates, general purpose money market mutual fund
shares, and other short-term financial assets. M3 is an
even broader aggregate. In addition to M2, it includes
large-denomination time deposits, term RPs and Eurodol-
lars, and institution-only money market funds. Because
both M2 and M3 contain both·savings and transaction
balances, they are much less likely to be affected by
portfolio shifts between transaction and savings balances
than M1 which contains only transaction balances.
4. Ceilings for banks and savings and loans were 5%
percent, while during some periods, credit union share
drafts were allowed to pay higher rates.
5. Data on NOW and Super NOW balances are from the
Federal Reserve Board's "Quarterly Survey of Number of
Selected Deposit Accounts" for November 1985. Personal
checking account average balances for 1980 are from the
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Functional Cost Analysis, published by the Federal
Reserve Banks. Average account balances in NOWs and
Super NOWs are well above typical minimum balance
requirements for free NOW and Super NOW accounts
which averaged $1073 and $3300 respectively, as
reported in Sheshunoff and Company's study entitled
"Pricing Bank Services and Loans," 1985.
6. See Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1981, page 542.
7. The statistical estimates are from a statistical model in
which the change in demand deposits was regressed on
the change in NOW depositsandchanges in interest rates,
a time trend, seasonal factors, and a dummy variaple for
the period covered by the special credit restraint program
in 1980. The model was estimated for the period from
February 1959 through June 1981 to include the first six-
month adjustment period following the nationwide intro-
duction of NOW accounts. A $1.00 increase in NOWs
(including ATS accounts) was estimated to result in a
statistically significant $.71 decline in demand deposits.
8. We were unable to obtain a statistically significant
estimate of the shift from NOWsinto Super NOWs.
9. There are reasons that not all (personal) transactiol')
deposits shifted into Super NOWs even though their total
returns likely exceeded those on other transaction
deposits. For one thing, implicit interest is nontaxable,
explicit interest is taxable and transactions fees are not
deductible. Thus, some depositors with high transactions
needs, small average balances, or high tax rates might
prefenoreceive nontaxableimplicitinterestthrough "free"
transaction deposits that earn no explicit interest rather
than receive taxable interest and pay (nondeductible)
transaction fees.
Similarly, many depositories continue to require minimum
balances in Super NOW accounts as amethod of compen-
sation for the transaction services they provide rather thanCD rates(twootheropen-market rates). The results are as
follows:
These regressions have zero intercepts and unitary
slopes, .as expected, and confirm that the T-bill rate is a
good measure of an open-market rate.
15. The model described by equation 7 in Table 2 was
also estimated in first difference form as a check on the
rooustness of the estimates (see Plosser and Schwert,
1977 and 1978, and Plosser, Schwert and White, 1982).
Also, the model was estimated excluding the first six
months after the account was offered to allow for a longer
adjustment not related to the explanatory variables. The
results, however, are relatively robust with respect to these
two changes.
16. It is possible that the interest elasticity of the demand
for currency increased when nontransactions accounts
were deregulated. If so, the test reported in Table 4 has
little power because the wrong breakpoint was used.
Using June 1978 as the breakpoint- the datethe 6-month
money market certificate was authorized and the date
many arguewas the first important step in deregulating the
interest rates on noncheckable accounts - we found that
the estimated short-run interest elasticity of currency
increased by a statistically significant amount. In fact, it
more than doubled from - .014 to - .031.
chargeJees directly. This is sensible even though such
balances incur the implicit reserve tax because this tax is
still far lower than the typical personal marginal incometax
rate.
10. In addition, the gradual reduction in reserve require-
mentsthat hasbeen occurring may increase the absolute
(but not relative) variation of interest payments on transac-
tion deposit accounts with open-market rates. The ratio of
required reserves to checkable deposits has declined
frprnover22 percent intheearly 194013 to about 10percent
now; there. was a 40 percent decline in the time since the
Monetary Control Act of 1980 was passed. As reserve
requirements decline, we expect that the absolute varia-
tion in interestrates on reservable deposits accounts with
respect to open-market rates will increase. This increased
variation, in turn, may affect the degree to which persons
substitute among different accounts and among deposit
and nondeposit investments depending on whether
demand depends on the absolute or relative variation in
rates.
11. See, for example, the discussion in Simpson (1984).
12. The simple model derived by Baumol implies income
and interest elasticities should be one-half. However, a
more general formulation is silent on the magnitude of
these parameters.
13. All interest rates are continuous time annual yields,
and thus have the same dimension.
14. To determine whether our use of the T-bill rate as a
measure of the open-market rate was appropriate, we
regressed the T-bill rate on the Federal Funds and 1-month
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